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Abstract 
The common e-threats deterring ecommerce are identity theft, hacking, virus attack, graffiti, phishing, Denial of 
Service (DoS), sabotage by disgruntled employees, loss of laptop, financial fraud and telecom driven frauds. These 
discourage users from online transactions. Organizations spend millions of dollars to implement the latest perimeter 
and core security technologies, to deter malicious attackers and to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
data. Yet, security breaches are common. It results in loss of opportunity cost, market capitalization and brand equity 
for organizations.  We propose e-risk insurance as a strategy to supplement the security technologies, and to mitigate 
these financial losses. In this paper, we propose two generalized linear models (GLM) namely Logit and Probit for 
quantification of the probability of an e-threat, using CSI/FBI data. We also compute the expected loss amount for 
organizations using collective risk model. Based on it, we ascertain the net premium to be accrued to the insurance 
companies. 
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Introduction 
 
Online security breaches are adversely impacting the top and bottom lines of most companies, worldwide. Federal 
Trade Commission in a report states that 8.3 million US citizens had been victims of identity theft in 2005 
(http://www.idtheftcenter.org/). CSI-FBI report 2007, states that the total amount of loss suffered due to malicious 
attack amounted to $66,930,950. Loss due to financial fraud alone contributed to $ 21,124,750, (i.e., 31% of the total 
loss) (Richardson, 2007).  This includes compromise of e-commerce sites mostly. The data compromised from these 
servers are used for identity thefts. In February 2008, the eBay's Korean unit had been hacked and 10 million users 
private information leaked. Chinese hackers attacked South Korea’s oldest and largest online shopping site, 
Auction.co.kr, this year. They compromised information of 18 million customers and took away financial data, too, 
from the organaization’s servers. In another incident, Max Ray Butler, a hacker, owned Cardersmarket website. He 
used his ecommerce site to hack into computer networks, to steal credit card and other personal information. He 
later used this information himself or resold them for malicious intent. In 2007, hackers compromised Monster 
Worldwide Inc servers and got hold of 146,000 users’ personal information. Monster Inc was running USAjobs.gov 
site, on behalf of the federal government. In the same year, AOL had an attack on its servers 
(http://www.pogowasright.org and http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm). This infected the 
servers with malicious programs and therein compromised confidential customer data from their databases. 
According to Gartner and the Ponemon Institute, the loss of a single non financial record amounts to $197. 
Approximately, 127 million records were lost in 2007, which amounts to a loss of $25 billion (Burger, 2008). 
Microsoft UK faced a graphiti attack, in 2007, when a set of hackers compromised the website’s security and 
performed a SQL injection. The most malicious botnet of 2007 was "Storm,”. It tricked people into opening an 
email, with the subject “230 dead as storm batters Europe". Subsequently, the Trojan worm was downloaded into the 
unsuspecting user’s machine Garretson). Researchers at Google have reported, that 10% web pages could 
successfully "drive-by download" a Trojan virus onto a visitor's computer. They had used a sample size of 4.5 
million websites for their study. Once the malicious software is downloaded into the user’s machine, hackers can 
easily compromise the target machine. The common techniques used by hackers are to place malicious software on 
Web sites, manipulating Web server security, manipulating user-posted content, advertising and third-party widgets 
(Provos, McNamee, Mavrommatis, Wang and Modadug, 2008). In a response to curve bad incidents, chief 
technology officers (CTO) resort to implementation of perimeter and core security (Tanenbaum, 1996, Whitman and  
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Mattford, 2007) technologies to prevent confidentiality (C), integrity (I) and availability (A) of data (Gordon and 
Loeb, 2002; Gordon A, L, Loeb, P. M., Sohai, T, 2003; Dhillon and Gholamreza, 2005; Dhillon and Backhouse, 
2000; Anderson, 2001; Schneier, 2000). The CSI FBI report 2007, states that 98% organizations have anti-virus 
software, 97% have firewall, 84% have implemented virtual private networks (VPN), 80% have anti-spyware, 69% 
have intrusion detection system (IDS), 51% have strong password management, 47% encrypt the confidential data 
stored, and so on (Richardson, 2007). These technological investments help to protect their information assets and 
also prevent their networks being clogged, sniffed or snooped.  This in turn helps, to reduce the frequency of the bad 
event. Numerous research efforts have gone into developing systems and networks that are invincible. Yet complete 
security still remains a myth (Austin, D. R, Darby A. R. C, 2003). White House, NASA, and Penatagaon website too 
have been compromised, in the recent past. In reality a combination of technology, policy and use of financial 
instruments need to be done to mitigate the losses to online business organizations. These necessities online business 
organizations take a proactive initiative to (i) assess the risk of the organization and (ii) to put in place necessary 
business continuity (BC) disaster recovery (DR) plans.  
 
The impact of such malicious attacks, can be broadly classified as loss of (i) opportunity cost (ii) market 
capitalization, and (iii) brand image (Mukhopadhyay 2007b; Mukhopadhyay, Chatterjee, Saha, Mohanti and Poddar 
2005). Opportunity cost (OC) of any service is defined as the value of all the other services that one must give up in 
order to deliver it (Varian, 2003; Brealey and Myers, 2000). If the communication channel is down, then online 
business organizations have substantial loss of OC. For example, a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on e-bay on 11th 
June 1999 had resulted in a loss of revenue to the tune of $3 to $5 Million. Market capitalization (MC) is the 
product of stock price times the total number of outstanding shares (Brealey, and Myers, 2000). If the organization 
has too many malicious attacks, then its stock price takes a dip. That, in turn, affects the MC (Campbell, Gordon, 
and Loeb, 2003). For example a DoS attack on e-bay on 11th June 1999 had resulted in drop of its share price by 
20% (Kesan, Majuca, and Yurcik, 2004). Recent studies have reported that the stock price of companies that had 
suffered a security breach in 2006 had fallen by 12 percent of its value since the breach (The Wall Street Journal, 
September 2006). Brand defines the attractiveness and familiarity in the market about a product/service provided by 
an organization. Brand equity permits companies to charge premium prices for products and services, contributing to 
increased profit margins. Companies invest huge amounts to develop brand equity. Too many adverse impacts 
tarnish brand image of an organization, and customers fear to transact with it (Campbell et al.,2003). 
 
In the context of rising security breaches, Sarbane’s Oxley (SOX) Act, Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act and Health 
Insurance Portability Insurance and Accountability Act (HIPAA), have laid down stringent and mandatory 
procedures for organizations, to ensure privacy and security of data. This aims to minimize the losses of security 
breaches. They also mandate that all organizations should have a proper contingency plan in place to mitigate the 
risk. Similarly, Basel II accord mandates that banks should do a proper risk assessment and quantification of their 
operational risk, and set aside a capital charge for the financial organization. Lawsuits can arise if a third party gets 
affected due to non adherence to these requirements.  
 
Of late there is a growing consensus about implementing IT governance by organizations. IT governance mandates 
effective management, policies, controls and procedures in place to ensure that an organization's information 
systems (i) support the organization's objectives and (ii) they are used responsibly and (iii) that IT-related risk is 
minimized. Effective IT governance (Brown and Grant, 2005; Solms 2005) is one element of compliance and 
corporate governance programme. Similarly, an effective IT governance programme helps to ensure efficient 
Enterprise Risk management (ERM) (Miccolis, 2000) process. To ensure proper information security management 
system (ISMS) is in place organizations need to be BS7799 certified. BS7799 in turn necessitates risk assessment 
and quantification. 
 
In this backdrop, we propose that organizations implement techno-financial solution (i.e., e-risk insurance) as risk 
mitigation strategy (i.e., to minimize the OC, MC and brand image drop) against malicious online attacks. In this 
paper we propose the use of e-risk insurance as an effective mechanism for loss reduction to organization. The basic 
premise for use of e-risk insurance (Kesan, Majuca, and Yurcik, 2004; Reid, and Stephen, 2001; Schenier, 200a, 
Mukhopadhyay et al., 2005; 2005a; 2005b; 2006; 2007; 2007a; 2007b) is the quantification of the expected e-risk, in 
case of a bad incident. In this work, we take into account eight types of attack such as virus attack, insider net abuse, 
laptop theft, DoS, unauthorized access to information, financial fraud, theft of proprietary information and telecom 
fraud from the CSI-FBI report (i.e., 1997 to 2007), and using generalized linear model (GLM), such as Logit and 
Probit, formulate a probabilistic pattern of attacks, for the past years. Based on this model, we then arrive at the 
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expected probability of attack. Then using collective risk modeling we arrive at the expected loss amount and the 
premium that the organization will need to pay to be indemnified for the same. 
 
Related work 
 
We chronologically trace the methods and techniques used in the area of IS risk management from 1970 to till date. 
Figure 1 shows that the literature can be broadly split into 3 phases namely: (i) conventional IS risk management (ii) 
social and organizational issues related to IS risk management and (iii) the risk to online businesses (e-risk) 
(Mukhopadhyay, 2007b). The e-risk literature has originated post 2000. This paper proposes the use of insurance for 
mitigating the risk. This is in line with the developing e-risk literature which broadly aims to: (i) classify e-risk (ii) 
quantify e-risk, through qualitative (E-R (Quali)), quantitative (E-R (Quanti)) and hybrid (E-R (Hybrid)) methods, 
(iii) its impact on business, (iv) suggest optimal security solutions, (v) propose e-risk insurance solutions and (vi) 
analyze the existing e-risk insurance products. The late 90’s to till date, multiple studies have been reported which 
use social and organizational aspects to assess and mitigate IT risk. The conventional IS risk management literature 
has its origin early as 1974, with the development of formal methods and sequentially the evaluation criteria. Efforts 
have been made since the late 70’s to quantify IT risk (R-A (Quanti)) methods. The qualitative (R-A (Quali)) 
methods originated in early 80’s, and the hybrid (R-A (Hybrid)) methods in the late 80’s. We would critically 
evaluate the popular models used from each of these phase.  
 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Years
Formal Methods
Evaluation Creiteria
RA(Quant)
RA(Quali)
RA(Hybrid)
RA(Behavioral)
E-R(classify)
E-R(Quant)
E-R(Quali)
E-R(Hybrid)
Te
ch
ni
qu
es
 
Figure 1:  IT risk literature (E-R stands for e-risk, RA represents risk analysis) 
 
Formal Models 
They focus on developing an analytical basis for the design, specification, realization, implementation and 
evaluation of security systems. The objective was to come up with rigorous mathematical proofs related to IS 
security issues. With this aim, Bell La Padula, Biba, Clarkson- Wilson and the Jueneman, proposed their models 
between 1979 and 1989. Table 1 compares the models. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of formal models 
 
             Models    
 
 Issue 
Bell La Padula 
Model 
Biba Model           Clarkson-Wilson 
Model 
Jueneman Model       
Object of evaluation Users, processors 
and data 
Users, 
processors 
and data 
Users, processors 
and data. 
Users, processors and data 
Classification basis Confidentiality Integrity. Confidentiality and 
Integrity. 
Confidentiality. 
Beneficiaries Military Military Business Business across 
heterogeneous networks 
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Evaluation Criteria 
These were developed to come up with a mechanism for evaluating the invincibility of the computer systems being 
developed.  The formal methods, discussed in the previous section, were the basis of development of evaluation 
criteria. These techniques were equally popular in the USA and the European countries. Table 2 critically compares 
the models. 
 
Table 2: Comparative study of evaluation criteria 
Criteria TCSEC ITSEC CC 
Common name Orange Book - ISO 15408 
Location USA European Union. USA and UK 
Object of 
evaluation 
Classified 
information. 
Classified information. Operating system, computer network 
and applications 
Classification basis Confidentiality. Confidentiality and 
Integrity.  
Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability 
Base model Bell La Padula Model  Clarkson-Wilson Model  - 
Security levels 6 6 7 
Focus Area Military data Military  and business data Military  and business data 
 
Risk Analysis 
 
Risk analysis studies, related to IT, can be broadly classified into three categories, namely qualitative, quantitative 
and hybrid, as shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Classification of approaches in risk analysis study 
Risk Analysis 
Qualitative Approach Quantitative Approach 
Probability  Fuzzy Logic 
Survey based  
Hybrid Approach 
Risk analysis 
Securtae 
LRAM 
BDSS 
Inversion Model Expert system 
Parker’s Computer Security Program 
Smith-Lim Approach 
CRAMM 
RISKPAC 
Survey based 
+ 
Mathematical 
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The quantitative techniques resort to rigorous mathematical studies, involving probability theory or fuzzy theory, to 
arrive at a value of the risk. Qualitative approaches use questionnaires and extensive survey of organizations to 
arrive at the impact of a failure or sabotage. The hybrid approach captures some subjective parameters though 
questionnaire method and uses the mathematical technique to arrive at final risk estimation. We review some 
representative works under each category in the following subsections. Our work in this thesis falls under the 
quantitative category. 
 
Quantitative techniques 
These techniques aim to arrive at an expected value of loss due to a malicious impact on a computer system. A 
comparative analysis of quantitative techniques is shown in Table 3. We categorize each of the techniques based on 
methodology and the output produced. It is to be noted that risk analysis model by Courtney (1977), first formulated 
that expected loss is the frequency of the impact times the loss associated with each impact. 
 
Table 3: Comparative analysis of quantitative techniques. 
Features Risk 
Analysis 
(1977) 
Securtae 
(1978) 
LRAM 
(1987) 
BDSS 
(1988) 
Inversion 
Model Expert 
 system 
Fuzzy Logic 
 
√  
Bayesian √ √  
M
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
Expert system 
 
 
 √ 
Expectation of loss  √  √ √ 
Vulnerability analysis √  √ 
 
Identification of threat √ √ √ 
Safeguards for 
 security 
 √ √ O
u
tp
u
t 
Controls to be 
  implemented 
 
 
√  
(LRAM =Livermore Risk Analysis Methodology; BDSS =Bayesian Decision Support System Qualitative 
techniques.  
√ = used method) 
 
Qualitative techniques 
These techniques use extensive interview or questionnaires to arrive at an expected value of loss due to a malicious 
impact on a computer system. We chronologically trace the qualitative techniques proposed for IT risk analysis. 
 Parker’s Computer Security Program (1981) 
It is a five phase model, as elaborated in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Phases of Parker’s model 
 
1 Identification 
and 
valuation of 
 assets 
(i) Identify assets (i.e., people, supplies, hardware, and data),  
(ii) Form of assets (i.e., moveable property, magnetic patterns, printed paper, 
(iii) Location of sites (i.e., remote, internal environment, computer)  
(iv) Accountability (i.e., first party or third party). 
 
2 Identification of 
 threats. 
(i) Source (i.e., employees or external vendors),  
(ii) Motives (i.e., human failure, irrational behavior),  
(iii) Act (i.e., physical, logical, covert etc); results (i.e., disclosure or destruction)  
(iv) Losses (i.e., monetary or denial of service). 
 
3 Risk assessment (i) 2 way matrix, vulnerable assets on x-axis, and the occupational nature on the y-axis. 
(ii) It is assumed that each of the assets have certain types of attacks (i.e., modification, 
destruction, disclosure, taking and denial of use).  
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(iii) The exposure of each of the assets, with respect to occupation is assessed on a scale 
of 5 (e.g., 5 indicate up to 100%, 4 indicate up to 80% etc).  
(iv) A value is attached to each of the assets. This provides a risk exposure data for each 
of the asset.  
(v) The top management using the concept of rational thinking, decide to implement 
security, for each of these assets (Baskerville 1993). 
 
4 Planning for 
Security 
This decision is based on the cost–benefit analysis, minimal human 
 interference, total reliability etc 
 
5 Implementation 
of the security 
 Safeguards 
It is a continuous process and safeguards need to be continuously monitored, as the 
vulnerability of the assets keeps changing. 
This model takes into account also social and human factors (such as motives, acts, sources of threats) associated 
with security (Baskerville 1993). The study is broadly qualitative in nature. 
 
 Smith-Lim Approach( 1984)  
The model consisted of two matrixes for risk evaluation.  The approach is detailed in Table 5. For example very 
high vulnerability and very low impact, implied low risk for and organization. The rules would be customized 
depending on the organization (Baskerville, 1993). 
 
Table 5: Smith-Lim Approach 
Threat-target 
matrix. 
 
It assumed 3 generic threats and 4 generic targets/assets. 
         Threat 
 
 
Target/Assets 
 
Natural 
hazard 
Direct 
human 
Indirect 
human 
 
Facility    
Hardware    
Software    
Documents    
 
Vulnerability 
impact analysis 
A rule base was developed, indicating the impact of risk arising from 2 parameters, 
(i) vulnerability (i.e., absence of safeguards) and  
(ii) impact (i.e., severity of impact).  
 
       Vulnerability 
Impact 
Lo Hi 
Lo  Low risk 
Hi   
 
 
 CRAMM (Farquar 1991). 
This qualitative method was used by Britain’s Central Computer and Telecommunication Agency (CCTA). This 
model has three stages, as illustrated in Table 6. CRAMM model output a set of recommendations for the 
information security of an organization. The main criticism of this model was that it churned highly technical 
reports. The solutions provided were in terms of safety measures. There was very little focus on social and human 
factors (Baskerville 1993). 
Table6: CRAMM model 
 Objective Methodology 
1. Identification of assets and 
assignment of monetary values.  
The monetary value associated based on impact in case of 
failure or sabotaged. 
 
2. Grouping assets based on their The owners of the asset asked to evaluate the vulnerability 
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vulnerabilities associated with it (5 point scale used). 
 
3. Evaluate the existing controls 
present in the organization 
 
 
Hybrid techniques 
This approach uses a combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques. A questionnaire method is used for data 
collection. This data is then fed into rigorous mathematical models.  
 RISKPAC (Computer Security Consultants 1988). 
It was a mixture of qualitative and quantitative approach. There were 12 types of questionnaire used to collect data 
from the end –user, as shown in Table 7.  
Table 7: RISKPAC 
Questionnaires Other Inputs Output 
The product and services the  organization  produce Business 
issues Necessity of computerization 
 
Applications used and impact to business 
 Personal computers and its related configuration MIS and 
business Computer systems and their operating systems 
 
Computer applications, the related operational risk 
and sensitivity to business  Risks Network associated risks 
 
IT audit and its necessity 
Type of security evaluation criteria to be used 
IT Audit 
Physical security of the organization 
 
Exposure to natural disaster BCP/DR Type of backup and disaster planning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk profiles of              
Organization.   
 
 
 
Controls already 
present in the 
organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Safeguards 
for the 
organization 
(MIS= management information Systems; BCP/DR= Business Continuity and Disaster recovery) 
 
The basic tenants of RISKPAC are summarized as follows: (i) it was based on Utility theory, (ii) it uses qualitative 
techniques for estimating security (i.e., linguistic variables, as in fuzzy sets), (iii) user friendly and could be 
understood by non-professionals too; (iv) used Courtney’s model (Baskerville, 1993) to estimate the expected loss. 
The basic drawbacks included: (i) limited capability to model; changes in organizational issues, (ii) it did not 
provide a mechanism of the viability of two or more security strategies (Baskerville 1993). 
 
Value based assessment of information system. 
A value focused approach was used to study the fundamental objectives for information system’s (IS) security and 
the means to achieve it. Data was collected through in depth interviews of IT mangers in various organizations. The 
main objective was to judge the values of people regarding IS security. This data was in turn validated by security 
experts. It was noted that social, human and interpersonal issues also contributed to towards IS security. These 
issues need to be looked into, for a proper risk assessment strategy. For example issues such as level of employee 
motivation, work ethics, level of personal privacy, capability level of an individual, knowledge of the business 
process, level of control etc were looked into (Dhillon et al.,  2005).  
 
RITE model for IS security. 
Technology issues, coupled with social and organization factors, give a holistic picture of the vulnerability in an 
organization. The security studies should go beyond issues of confidentiality, integrity and availability. Social 
issues, such as responsibility (R) of roles, integrity (I) of employees, trust (T) and ethicality (E) too, need to be 
looked into. The behavioral factors need to be monitored in an organization to get a proper understanding of the risk 
perceptions (Dhillon et al.,  2000). 
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End –to- end planning for information security  
All computer systems are vulnerable. An end to end planning solution for risk mitigation associated with IT 
comprising of 4 stages are discussed here (Straub & J.Richard, 1998). Table 8 summaries their work. 
 
Table 8: Strategies for end –to end planning 
 
1. Recognition of 
 security 
 problem 
(i) Overall risk perception of the industry;  
(ii) Controls imposed in the organization; 
(iii) Local risk perception,  
(iv) Formation of the managerial perception of the system risk.  
 
2. Risk analysis Managerial perception is used as the basis for the risk calculation.  
 
3. Generation of 
alternatives to 
 mitigate risk 
The alternatives include  
(i) deterrence;  
(ii) prevention;  
(iii) detection;  
(iv) Remedies.   
The focus is to maximize prevention and minimize remedial action. 
 
4. Finding out a viable 
 strategy for 
 implementation of  
security 
(i) Chalk out a planning decision for security implementation. This 
involves developing a counter matrix to evaluate the effectiveness 
of strategy vis-à-vis the alternative strategies discussed in stage 3.  
(ii)  Implement the best security strategy, depending on cost –benefit 
analysis and the risk perception of the system  
 
 
All these follow a feedback loop and decisions are taken in an iterative fashion. This mechanism is innovative as it 
discusses a planning horizon solution to the risk mitigation issue. 
A generalized linear model for e-risk quantification 
Our aim is to quantify the probability of occurrence of bad events such as virus attack, insider net abuse, laptop 
theft, DoS, unauthorized access to information, financial fraud, theft of proprietary information and telecom fraud 
based on data available from the CSI-FBI report (i.e., 1997 to 2007).  We, use generalized linear model (GLM) 
(McCullagh and Nelder, 1989, Dobson, 2002) to fit the CSI –FBI attack data. The CSI survey is the most widely 
quoted set of statistics in the industry, and is currently in its 12th year. In the 2007 survey, they had 494 respondents. 
This number has varied over the years. The sample space was spread across both the government and private sector 
and multiple industries. The representation of the major sectors was as follows: financial sector (20%), followed by 
consulting (11%), education (11%), information technology (10%), and manufacturing (8%).  41% of the 
respondents were “people responsible for enterprise security”. We have chosen the GLM where, the expectation (µ) 
of the dependent variable Y, is a member of the exponential family. Y is connected to the linear combination of the 
variables XTβ, where X denotes time. Equation (1) defines the relationship between time X and Y variables.  
 
            µ= E(Y|X) ; η = XTβ ; η = G(µj) ;     (1) 
 
          E (Y|X) = G-1 (XTβ)      (2) 
  
         Where we assume, XTβ = β0 + β1*t and   XTβ = β0 + β1*t + β2*t2 
 
Here we assume G to be either a linear or a quadratic Logit link function, and t denotes time.  Therefore equation (2) 
can be written as shown in equation (3). 
 
                                                           Logit (p) =log (p / (1- p)) =G (µ)         (3) 
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     p = 1/ (1+ exp-η)           (4) 
     
Equation (4) denotes the probability (p) of a malicious attack. η can take any value in the range from –∞ to ∞. The 
exponential function exp-η is always positive, and so p of each attack maps to the range [0, 1] i.e., 0< p <1.  
 
Our proposed GLM models for studying the attack patterns are as shown in equation (5, 6, and 7) 
 
Model 1:  p = 1/ (1 + exp (-β0 + β1*t)         (5)  
                          
  Model 2:  p = 1/ (1 + exp(-β0 + β1*t +  β2*t2)        (6) 
 
Similarly, we propose a linear probit model to fit the data points. 
 
Model 3:  G (µ) = Ф-1(µ) = β0 + β1*t,     (7) 
    where Ф is normal cumulative density function. 
We assume all the eight types of attacks, as surveyed by CSI follow a binomial distribution, have probability mass 
functions as shown by equation (8). 
iii
i
i yn
i
y
iy
n
ii )p(1pC )(yf −−=  ; i =1 to k years   (8) 
Here ni denotes the sample size of respondents interviewed in the ith year, yi is the number of respondents who had 
felt the brunt of the attack in the ith year , pi is the probability of particular type of attack occurring and (1- pi ) is the 
probability of a particular type of attack not occurring.  The parameters of the GLM are estimated by the maximum 
likelihood estimate (MLE) method. For a given probability distribution specified by f (yi; β, F) and observations y = 
(y1, y2. . . yn)', the log-likelihood function for β and F, expressed as a function of mean values µ  = (µ1,…, µn) of the 
responses {Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn}, has the form shown in equation (9). 
                      ∑
=
=
k
i
ii yf
1
j ))((LN )y ;( LN µ    (9) 
The MLE of the parameters ß is obtained by iterative re-weighted least squares (IRLS) (McCullagh and Nelder, 
1989). 
We choose the GLM model, as opposed to the linear regression models (i.e., E (Y|X) = XTβ or Y= XTβ +ε), for the 
study, as the error term (ε) needs to be continuous in nature and hence it implies that the response Y must have 
a continuous distribution as well. Hence, linear regression model fails to deal with discrete Y’s as that are studied in 
this case. Also, analysis of the attack data we find that it follows a non-linear trend. Figure 3, shows the number of 
respondents, who have agreed to the fact that they faced any of this eight type of attacks of the years (i.e., 1999 to 
2007). It is also evident that insider net access and financial fraud are on the rise, whereas the other six types are on 
the decline.  A linear model will not be a good fit for this set of data points. 
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Figure 3: The number of attacks from 1999 to 2007 
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The main reasons sighted for the decline of the attacks are (i) implementation of security technology (Bagchi and 
Udo, 2003), (ii) mandatory compliance to SoX, GLB, HIPAA or (iii) BS7799 norms (Mukhopadhyay et. al.,2006, 
Richardson, 2007) and so on.  
 
We find a similar type of work by Bacghi et al., 2003, where they had proposed a Gompertz model for predicting the 
growth of the malicious attacks. They had used the model shown in equation (10). 
 
N (t) = exp [(-c/q) exp (-qt) + K]   (10) 
where t = time, N(t) = cumulative number of attacks incidents at time t, c= net rate of instigation to attacks, q= rate 
of inhibition to attacks. 
 
We argue that the probability models, such as Logit and Probit are a better choice, as we are modeling a totally 
uncertain event. It is always a win- win situation for the malicious intruder. A smart hacker needs only a single point 
to break into an organizations network, whereas the CTO needs to know all the gaps, to prevent his entry (Anderson, 
2001). Similarly, a zero-day attack can compromise any organization’s core and perimeter security and cause 
enormous damage. The number of attacks in a given year is totally independent of the previous year, as CTO’s 
implement security measures at the earliest to avoid further losses. Thus, use of cumulative number of respondents 
as in equation (6) is not justified. The use of probabilistic model such as Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) is also 
justified, as experienced CTO’s, can provide prior belief regarding the incidence of malicious attacks against 
information assets (Jensen, 1996). These beliefs can be modified as more data is obtained. It is also noted that the 
use of security technology merely lowers the probability of the attack and not the actual number of attacks. It is of 
outmost importance that organizations have a contingency plan, to mitigate the monetary loss, whenever an attack 
happens. Such business continuity plans needs to budget for the expected loss of revenue, due to a malicious attack, 
as opposed to the actual number of attacks. We suggest that use of e-risk insurance (Kesan, Majuca, and Yurcik, 
2004; Reid, and Stephen, 2001; Schenier, 200a, Mukhopadhyay et al., 2005; 2005a; 2005b; 2006; 2007; 2007a; 
2007b) as an instrument to hedge such uncertain risk. The basic premise of insurance rests on the assumption that 
the expected exposure to risk can be computed. The use probabilistic models such as Weibull, Poissson, Negative 
Binomial etc to model the frequency of the risk and also the claim amount distributions, in case of an expected 
calamity (Hossack, Pollard and Zehnwirth, 1983) is common. Thus, under all circumstances, use of a probability is 
well justified for the model.  
 
Using our 3 models, defined in equation (5, 6, 7), we compute the probability of attack.  We use collective risk 
model (Hossack et al., 1983), to compute the expected loss.  Collective risk model assumes that the number of 
attacks (N) and the loss amounts (L) are both stochastic in nature. Let us assume that there are N malicious attacks, 
such that each attack leads to a loss of Li. Each of these losses are independent and identically distributed (iid). The total 
loss (S) for virus attack, to an organization in a given year, is shown in equation (11). 
 
S= L1  + L2 +…………………+ LN    (11) 
 
The expected value of the loss due to an attack is computed using equation (12). 
 
E (S) = E (N) * E (S)   (12) 
 
                E (S) = ni* pi* MAi 
 
Where ni = denotes the sample size of respondents interviewed in the ith year, pi= probability of attack in the ith year,  
MAi= monetary impact of an attack in the ith year . To compute the premium, we need to compute the variance of 
the total loss (S), given by the equation (13). 
      
     Var (S) = E (N) * Var (L) + {E(L)}2 * Var (N)  (13) 
    
Then based on the expected loss arrived at in equation (11) the premium is defined as the expected loss E (LAmti) 
times the times The premium is arrived at by using equation (14), after taking into account overhead loading (OV) 
and the contingency loading (k).  
              
    Premium= (1+OV)* E (S) + k* √Var (S)                                    (14) 
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Results and Discussion 
 
Figure 4a and 4b illustrates the Logit and Probit curves that fit onto the probability of attack data points. The red line 
indicates the Logit curve, while the green line depicts the Probit curve. We did not plot the quadratic Logit equation, 
since we found that there was significant improvement to the curve fitting using it. The Logit and the Probit data 
curves almost superimpose on each other. The expected probability curves reflect a decrease in all types of attacks 
from 1999 to 2007. It is to be noted that the decrease has occurred following a smooth exponential manner pattern, 
over time. This is very clearly evident for the theft of propitiatory information, in Figure 4b. This corroborates to the 
fact that there will always be some amount of threat of an attack, and that it can never become zero. In Figure 3a, 
especially, the data points of DoS attacks is so widely dispersed, that it is not possible to fit any probabilistic curve 
(such as Logit or  Probit) to it.  
 
Figure 4a: Logit and Probit curves fit to the probability of attack data 
  
 
Figure 4b: Logit and Probit curves fit to the probability of attack data 
 
The coefficients of the Logit function, and the the chi square and deviance values are shown in Table 9. The values 
of the Probit curve are also almost similar. The chi-square values (degrees of freedom 7, at significance level 5%) 
are then compared to the tabulated ones.  Deviance is computed using equation (15). 
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Table 9: Coefficients of the linear Logit function and tabulated Chi-square values 
 Virus Insider net 
abuse 
Laptop theft DoS Unauthorized 
access 
Financial fraud Theft of prop 
info 
Telecom 
fraud 
β0 2.773 2.6104 0.74906 -0.58134 0.68956 -1.8243 -0.72308 -1.7477 
β1 -0.27036 -0.33225 -0.10541 -0.028015 -0.19522 -0.059452 -0.20579 -0.08724 
Tabulated 
Chi square 
value 
14.414 42.941 16.211 19.203 40.831 16.036 23.206 14.159 
Deviance 56.78 200.85 20.75 74.48 79.27 25.57 42.04 18.96 
  
Based on the chi-square values, the Logit curves fitted to the data on virus and telecom fraud show a good amount of 
fitness. The mean values of the other Logit curves also fit well too. Over dispersion in the data points, creates 
problem in fitting the Logit and Probit curves (McCullagh, et al., 1989). 
  
Our probability based generalized linear model (GLM) such as Logit and Probit, perform much better in comparison 
to Gomperterz and Logistic curves fitted to the cumulative attack data points, by Bagchi et.al, (2003).  The predicted 
number of attacks and the curve fitting was proper only for a short duration of time (i.e., 12 months only) (Bagchi 
et.al, 2003). 
 
Proof of concept 
 
From Figure 5a and 5b it is clear that the expected and the observed values of losses for the eight types of e-threats 
are very close. The expected loss amount has been computed using equation (12). Here, we have used the expected 
values of the probability computation as obtained from the Logit model, and multiplied it with the total number of 
respondents interviewed, and the loss amount per attack. 
 
-
5,000,000.00
10,000,000.00
15,000,000.00
20,000,000.00
25,000,000.00
30,000,000.00
35,000,000.00
40,000,000.00
45,000,000.00
v
iru
s
n
et
ac
ce
ss
la
pt
op
DO
S
u
n
au
th
or
iz
ed
ac
es
s 
to
 
in
fo
Fi
n
fra
u
d
th
ef
t o
f p
ro
p
te
le
co
m
fra
u
d
Attack Type
Lo
ss
 
Am
o
u
n
t
Total Loss_2005
Exp_Loss_2005
-
2,000,000
4,000,000
6,000,000
8,000,000
10,000,000
12,000,000
14,000,000
16,000,000
18,000,000
v iru
s
ne
tac
ce
ss la p
top DO
S
un
au
tho
rize
d a
ce
ss
 
to i
nfoFin
frau
d
the
ft o
f pr
op
tele
co
m  
fra u
d
Attack Type
Lo
ss
 
am
o
u
n
t
Total Loss_2006
Exp_Loss_2006
 
Figure 5a : Expected Loss and Observed Loss during 2005        Figure 5b: Expected Loss and Observed Loss during 2006 
 
 
 
Premium computation 
 
Organization’s can pay a constant premium amount to the insurance company and get indemnified against any 
losses later. We use equation (14) to compute the total premium that would have accrued to the insurance industry, 
in 2005, if all the expected attacks actually happened (Figure 6). We assume the overhead to and the contingency 
loading to be 10% respectively. The final premium fixation would take into account also the amount of risk that is 
passed to the insurance company and also on the fact, whether the organization is risk averse or a risk taker. The 
presence of such a large pool of revenue would surely motivate insurance companies to offer e-risk insurance 
products. 
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Figure 6: Premium to be paid for loss indemnification 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
E-risk assessment and quantification, forms an important component of information security management. In this 
paper, we have developed two probability models (i.e., Logit and Probit) to quantify the frequency of malicious 
attacks. Our model performs better than the existing one (Bacghi et al., 2003). The work can be further extended by 
assuming other parameters along with time. The basic assumption of the attacks and their corresponding losses are 
independent can be relaxed.  A copula model, in that context would be another alternative to model the attacks. The 
sparse CSI/FBI data set is also a major constraint to modeling.   
 
We have also proposed use of insurance for indemnification of the loss. We have even computed the expected loss 
for each type of attack, suggested the premium to be charged for indemnification of loss. The use of e-risk insurance 
by organizations will promote ecommerce transactions. 
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